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Abstract: 
This  study  investigates  defections  from  the  Al-Shabaab  insurgency  in  Somalia.  Thirty-two  disengaged  Al-
Shabaab combatants were interviewed about their motivations, grievances, needs, and challenges in relation to
the recruitment, defection, and post-defection phases. This paper focuses on post-defection challenges, where we
found the primary concern to be lack of personal security. Without adequate security, disengaged combatants
are vulnerable to being hunted and killed by Al-Shabaab. This significant threat discourages further mass and in -
dividual defections. We also found that disengaged combatants joined and defected out of religious zeal, to fight
for what they believed to be a holy Islamic cause. This same zeal led them to defect, as they came to believe Al-
Shabaab was not obeying the true Islamic faith. Indiscriminate killing by Al-Shabaab disenchants its religiously
pious members, creating an opportunity to encourage mass and individual defections. However, if disengaged
combatants are not protected from retribution, defection will lose its appeal. 
Keywords: defection; ex-combatant; Al-Shabaab; violent extremism; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion (DDR)
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On Saturday,  October  14,  2017,  a  vehicle-borne  im-
provized explosive device (VBIED) detonated in Mo-
gadishu, Somalia, killing over 350 people (Burke 2017).
This was the largest such attack in Somalia’s conflict-
ridden history. Although Al-Shabaab did not claim re-
sponsibility, they are likely to have carried out the at-
tack (Burke 2017), demonstrating the reach and im-
pact the armed group still has. Despite concerted ef-
forts  by  the  Federal  Government  of  Somalia  (FGS),
Somali National Army (SNA), African Union Mission
in  Somalia  (AMISOM),  and  international  partners
such as  the  United States  and British  governments
and  militaries,  Al-Shabaab  still  maintains  territorial
control, governance capabilities, funding streams, and
operational capacity as it demonstrated in that inci-
dent. Military force has not succeeded in eliminating
it. In fact, the “Saturday attack” was a direct result of
Al-Shabaab escalation in response to increased mili-
tary actions against them, having vowed in early 2017
“to increase its attacks after both the Trump adminis-
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tration and Somalia’s  recently  elected president  an-
nounced  fresh  military  efforts  against  the  group”
(Burke 2017). Al-Shabaab cannot be eradicated by mil-
itary force. Alternative means must be sought, stud-
ied, and implemented to end this civil conflict. Under-
standing, promoting, and supporting individual defec-
tion from Al-Shabaab is a viable process to sustain-
ably reduce the insurgency.
Defection is touted as a leading alternative to de-
grade Al-Shabaab by the FGS (Shaban 2017), the US
government (Trofimov 2018), and international orga-
nizations such as AMISOM, United Nations, and In-
ternational  Organization  of  Migration  (IOM)  (AMI-
SOM 2017).  Policy,  programs,  and resources  are di-
rected  towards  supporting  defection,  rehabilitation,
and reintegration of disengaged Al-Shabaab combat-
ants. At the time of writing there were Disarmament,
Rehabilitation,  and  Reintegration  (DRR)  centers  in
Baidoa, Kismayo, Mogadishu, and Beledweyne, all un-
der the umbrella of the Somali National Program for
the Treatment and Handling of Disengagement Com-
batants. Although there are no confirmed figures, So-
mali government officials estimate two thousand dis-
engaged Al-Shabaab combatants have gone through
some form of DRR program in Somalia (Febab-Brown
2018, 14). 
In this article we use the term DRR as a substitute
for  the  internationally  recognizable  term  Disarma-
ment, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). The
ministry overseeing the Baidoa center is titled the Bay
Ministry for Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reinte-
gration (DRR). We suspect the term rehabilitation is
used instead of demobilization because the program is
aimed at rehabilitating individual disengaged combat-
ants of Al-Shabaab rather than a mass group demobi-
lization agenda. 
This study explores why individuals join and defect
from Al-Shabaab and what challenges they face post-
defection.  Understanding  Al-Shabaab  member  pro-
files, motivations, grievances, challenges, and more, is
crucial for developing strategies to promote sustain-
able defection. Sustainability is imperative: life must
be  better  for  those  who  leave  Al-Shabaab  than  for
those who remain. As of now this is not the case for
those at the Baidoa center. In July of 2017 we inter-
viewed  thirty-two  disengaged  combatants  of  Al-
Shabaab living at the DRR center in the government-
controlled town of Baidoa in the Bay region of Soma-
lia.  Directly  outside  of  Baidoa  is  Al-Shabaab  con-
trolled territory, and Al-Shabaab has undercover oper-
ators inside the town. The DRR center was located on
a cordoned-off street  along with the AMISOM base
(after the research was conducted, the center was re-
located),  and had AMISOM personnel  guarding  the
fortified compound. If the disengaged combatants re-
mained in the center they were safe from Al-Shabaab,
but if  they left to visit  family, reintegrate back into
their home community, or start a business, their per-
sonal security became vulnerable. 
The  DRR  center,  run  in  coordination  by  the  Bay
Ministry for DRR and IOM, operates a four-month re-
habilitation and training program consisting of  reli-
gious  and ideological  re-education,  trauma counsel-
ing, and technical training in electrical work, masonry,
carpentry, and mechanics. Completing the rehabilita-
tion  program entitles  recipients  to  receive  a  $1,500
grant toward materials to start a business. The exis-
tence,  design,  and implementation of this  DRR pro-
gram is commendable. The program is implemented
at the state level (South West), with limited economic
and operational support from the federal government.
In  Inside  Rebellion Weinstein  describes  the  chal-
lenges insurgents face: “Rebel groups face a series of
challenges  in  civil  war  that  threaten  the  organiza-
tional structures they have built and may necessitate
changing strategies in response. These challenges in-
clude the need to recover from battlefield losses, man-
age success,  respond to changing endowments,  and
react  to  new government  counterinsurgency  strate-
gies”  (2006,  295).  As  Al-Shabaab  members  face  in-
creasing risk to life, the less invested members will opt
out of the insurgency (8–9). It is in the interest of Al-
Shabaab to do whatever necessary to dissuade mem-
bers  from  defecting,  including  hunting  down  and
killing defectors as a deterrent. As Kalyvas points out,
violence is used by Al-Shabaab as a “communicative
function with a clear deterrent dimension” (2006, 26).
The primary goal of Al-Shabaab violence against de-
fectors is to create fear in its members to deter defec-
tion (29).
Based on our research, we believe defection is a vi-
able mechanism to sustainably degrade Al-Shabaab—
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if the FGS and its supporters can provide security and
opportunity to defectors.  Amongst Al-Shabaab com-
batants, “disillusionment is rife … with many of the
rank and file deeply dissatisfied with the harsh reality
and associated traumas of combat” (Horgan 2018). 
1 Definitions and Literature Review
For the purposes of this paper, the term  disengaged
combatant will be the umbrella term used to refer to
individuals who have left Al-Shabaab. Not all of the
disengaged combatants in our study had been fight-
ers; the functions included driver and tax collector. We
chose to use the term disengaged combatant because it
is the term used by interviewees to self-identify and
the term used by the Somali Ministry for DRR over-
seeing the program. Another important term for this
research is defector. To qualify as a defector for this re-
search, the individual must have left Al-Shabaab on
their own accord to join a rival group or seek govern-
ment protection,  and willingly  share  information or
experience. The disengaged combatants in our study
had chosen to leave Al-Shabaab and participate in the
DRR process. Traditional definitions of defection are
often limited to interstate politics. In the context of
the non-state actor Al-Shabaab, disengaged combat-
ants had not defected from one state to another. In-
stead, they had left a non-state actor but stayed in
their  home country  of  Somalia.  Additionally,  in  the
classical interstate sense a defector must hold a sig-
nificant role in the organization they defect from and
have valuable information to share. In our research we
also include low-level  members  as  defectors  if  they
chose to leave and were willing to provide information
to the FGS. In intrastate conflict, even low-level mem-
bers  possess critical  strategic  information. Addition-
ally,  due  to  the  generally  smaller  size  of  insurgent
forces,  each  individual  defector  is  meaningful  com-
pared to large state militaries in interstate conflict. In
order to promote more defection from Al-Shabaab, it
is imperative to understand the motives of those who
have already left. 
There  are  two  primary  types  of  literature  on  Al-
Shabaab defection,  scholarly  articles  and news arti-
cles. This literature review analyzes both fields, as well
as general defection theory. 
There is a limited number of scholarly articles ad-
dressing Al-Shabaab defection. Botha and Abdile fo-
cused on the recruitment of Al-Shabaab combatants
in “Radicalisation and Al-Shabaab Recruitment in So-
malia” (2014), for which they interviewed eighty-eight
ex-combatants,  seven of  them off the record.  While
their research primarily focused on recruitment and
the reasons interviewees stayed with Al-Shabaab, the
researchers collected one data point on defection. Had
the  subjects  had  any  regrets  since  joining  Al-
Shabaab?  33  percent  regretted  joining  Al-Shabaab
while 42 percent regretted joining and getting caught
by  AMISOM  or  the  Somali  authorities.  Botha  also
wrote on Al-Shabaab recruitment and radicalization
in Kenya in “Political Socialization and Terrorist Radi-
calization among Individuals Who Joined Al-Shabaab
in  Kenya”  (2014)  and  on  political  radicalization  of
youth into Al-Shabaab focused on individual drivers
in  “Factors  Facilitating  Radicalization  in Kenya and
Somalia”  (2016,  71–84).  Hassan detailed  the  driving
factors of  radicalization of Somali  youth in “Under-
standing Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of
al-Shabab and Somali Youth” (2012, 18), using empiri-
cal data gathered through focus groups with ex-mem-
bers of Al-Shabaab in Nairobi, Kenya. Hassan found
that identity and feelings of neglect were the primary
factors driving these Somali youth to join Al-Shabaab
(20).
In contrast to the little that has been written on Al-
Shabaab defectors, there is a plethora of sources on
individual defectors from non-state armed groups in
other civil war contexts. The key literature on defec-
tion from extremist groups includes: Barrelle’s “Pro-
integration:  Disengagement  from and Life  after  Ex-
tremism”  (2015)  examining  individual  defection  and
reintegration  of  extremists  in  a  Western  context;
Chernov Hwang’s “The Disengagement of Indonesian
Jihadists: Understanding the Pathways” (2017); on the
disengagement process and psychology of the deradi-
calization of individuals; Neil Ferguson’s, “Disengag-
ing  from  Terrorism:  A  Northern  Irish  Experience”
(2016)  exploring  push  and  pull  factors  encouraging
and  discouraging  disengagement  from  extremist
groups ; John Horgan’s, Walking Away from Terrorism:
Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist
Movements (2009)  on  the  psychology  of  terrorism
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specifically  pertaining  to  defection;  and  Fernando
Reinares’s, “Exit from Terrorism: A Qualitative Empiri-
cal Study on Disengagement Deradicalization Among
Members of ETA” (2011) parsing the nuances between
deradicalization  (attitudinal  change)  and  disengage-
ment (behavioral change). Much of this literature on
individual defectors from extremist groups focuses on
the mindset of the individual, processes of psychologi-
cal change, and variables that lead the individual to-
ward disengagement. While this literature is impera-
tive to understanding the individual motivation and
evolution, it does not speak to the physical security
challenges faced by disengaged Al-Shabaab combat-
ants. 
While there is limited empirical data specifically on
Al-Shabaab defection, there are numerous news arti-
cles on the subject, primarily interviews with defec-
tors and coverage of mass defections. The Observer re-
ported two hundred individuals defecting to AMISOM
to escape the violence (Observer 2012). A CNN article
covers individuals defecting from Al-Shabaab to join
the Islamic State’s expansion into the Horn of Africa
(Kriel and Duggan 2015). According to a  Wall Street
Journal article published on October 27,  2016,  a few
hundred  Al-Shabaab  defectors  defected  to  Islamic
State (Vogt 2016). Mass defection has been reported
by multiple sources. Most notably,  The Star reported
that  more  than  seven  hundred  Al-Shabaab  recruits
had defected  and  returned to  Kenya after  realizing
they had been given empty promises during recruit-
ment  (Mohamed 2015).  Some had been forcibly  re-
cruited and left as soon as they had an opportunity to
do so, while a few left because of injuries suffered in
combat. There are also reports that defection numbers
have been inflated by the FGS and Somali  security
forces  to  boost  morale,  generate  local  and  interna-
tional  support,  and  sow  dissent  within  Al-Shabaab
(Bacon 2018). While there has been a significant pro-
portion of  defectors among the disengaged combat-
ants in the four official DRR centers in Somalia, we
believe  there  has  likely  been some exaggeration  by
the FGS and Somali security forces.
In both scholarly and news articles, there is limited
empirical data on Al-Shabaab defection. The heavy re-
liance on news articles is limiting as it does not pro-
vide a theoretical exploration of the issue. A scientific
study  investigating  the  specific  reasons  for  Al-
Shabaab defection and empirical data profiling disen-
gaged combatants before, during, and after their time
in Al-Shabaab will therefore fill a major gap in the lit-
erature. 
Another important area of research is defection the-
ories. Theorizing defection through a structural lens
allows researchers to discover key insights into issues
of internal dissent, organizational structure, and tac-
tics. The following theories from this perspective give
valuable insights. 
Bjørgo and Horgan theorize how push and pull fac-
tors lead to defection (2008). Their work is important
as  they  specifically  address  defection  from terrorist
organizations. Push factors are negative stimuli that
discourage a member from continuing with the orga-
nization. This may result from tensions in the group,
increased violence, or a loss of personal faith. Our em-
pirical  study  of  Al-Shabaab  disengaged  combatants
affirms this as a significant factor in their choice to
defect.  Participants  in  our  study  repeatedly  spoke
about their disappointment with Al-Shabaab leader-
ship, strategic tactics of indiscriminate killing of Mus-
lims, and being forced to kill family and clan mem-
bers. This led to a loss of faith in Al-Shabaab as an Is-
lamic authority.  Conversely,  pull  factors distract the
member and “pull” them in a different direction. Pull
factors  often  include  a  change  in  family  structure,
new  goals,  or  growing  older  (Bjørgo  and  Horgan
2008). To a lesser degree, pull factors were apparent in
our study. Some participants wanted to make a better
living, provide for their family, and pursue a different
lifestyle. 
Bjørgo and Horgan define three types of  defector.
The first, which they call “dropouts,” leave the group
but stay true to its ideology. Dropouts do not publicly
attack  their  former  group.  The  second  type,  “rene-
gades,” abandon the group and its ideology but avoid
publicly attacking the original group. The third type,
“traitors,” leave the group and its ideology and pub-
licly attack the group by joining the government or
another non-state armed group (Bjørgo and Horgan
2008). How a group responds to a defector largely de-
pends  on  which  type  of  defection  is  involved.  The
most dangerous type of defector is  the traitor,  who
provokes an extremely negative response and is often
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pursued  and  threatened  with  physical  violence.  We
would  classify  the  participants  in  our  study  as
traitors,  with  most  bordering  on  renegade.  While  a
few participants avidly opposed Al-Shabaab and ex-
pressed desire for revenge, many appeared to be re-
luctant  participants  in  helping  the  FGS,  SNA,  and
AMISOM combat  the  insurgency.  Most  participants
just wanted a safe and prosperous life and did not ap-
pear thirsty for revenge against Al-Shabaab. 
Popovic introduces another interesting theory about
defection (2014). His paper examining state sponsor-
ship of rebel groups addresses concepts on organiza-
tional  structure  and  defection.  Popovic  argues  that
defection is most likely when an organization is de-
centralized  because  such  organizations  “have  weak
central leadership that is unable to control, monitor,
or punish its rank and file” (Popovic 2014, iii). External
shocks such as conflict with another group or a natu-
ral disaster can also produce defections.  
In  interstate  defection,  protocols  such  as  asylum
and witness protection exist to protect the individual
from reprisals by their former group. In an intrastate
conflict such as Somalia, the lack of asylum, a weak
central government, and insurgent territorial  control
create an insecure environment for defectors. Because
disengaged  combatants  were  members  of  a  desig-
nated  terrorist  organization,  international  asylum is
highly unlikely to be granted. In the context of an on-
going civil war and fragile state, the weak central gov-
ernment does not have the resources or capacity to
put  disengaged  combatants  into  witness  protection
programs. The combination of limitations means that
intrastate defection in a fragile state is extremely dan-
gerous  as  mechanisms  to  protect  defectors  from
reprisals are lacking.
Throughout  our  search  of  relevant  literature  we
found significant  research gaps in in relation to Al-
Shabaab defection. This study seeks to address those
gaps.
2 Limitations
Field research in Somalia is subject to limitations con-
cerning security,  access,  and language.  The primary
obstacle is personal security risk for researchers. Kid-
napping for ransom by Somali pirates and Al-Shabaab
is a prevailing threat, while Al-Shabaab’s regular at-
tacks  on  businesses  and  government  facilities  fre-
quented by foreigners pose a security challenge. For-
eigners working for political, business, humanitarian,
and research organizations are valuable targets who
must be housed in guarded compounds and have per-
sonal security guards accompany them when outside.
These  security  challenges  heavily  limit  freedom  of
movement to conduct research. Meetings and sched-
ules must be coordinated discreetly and remain flexi-
ble to respond to changes in the security situation on
the  ground.  This  leads  to  repeatedly  rescheduled
meetings and lost research days if the security situa-
tion  is  unsafe.  Additionally,  movement  is  restricted,
inefficient,  and  expensive  throughout  Somalia.  Al-
though the FGS, SNA, and AMISOM have liberated
most of Somalia’s major cities from Al-Shabaab con-
trol,  control  elsewhere  is  disputed  or  held  by  Al-
Shabaab. Overland travel requires a substantial mili-
tary convoy, creating a country of city islands accessi-
ble only by air. Domestic commercial flights are much
more regular and consistent than five years ago, but
securing  a  seat  still  requires  strategic  planning  and
luck. The most insecure areas are only accessible by
United Nations  Humanitarian  Air  Service (UNHAS),
which has a limited schedule and significant cost. The
security risk required a hired security team for the re-
searchers, a significant expense. In the interests of se-
curity and economy, we created a two-week timeline
for the interviews, and we conducted interviews only
at the Baidoa DRR center. If disengaged Al-Shabaab
combatants at other centers had been included in our
study, the findings might have differed. We do believe,
however, that we interviewed a representative sample
of low-level disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants.
Another major limitation is access to subjects and
population.  To  collect  data  on  multiple  disengaged
combatants, researchers need access to large groups
willing to participate. We found such a group at the
DRR  center  in  Baidoa,  housing  approximately  two
hundred  disengaged  Al-Shabaab  combatants.  The
Baidoa center’s residents are deemed a “low-risk” se-
curity threat by the National Program for the Treat-
ment  and  Handling  of  Disengagement  Combatants
and thus authorized for a reintegration process. The
population of this study is therefore not representa-
tive  of  Al-Shabaab  as  a  whole,  but  a  sub-group  of
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“low-risk” defectors. We interviewed thirty-two disen-
gaged combatants at the center. Population size is a
limitation because it is infeasible to interview a large
population of disengaged combatants in Somalia out-
side of a DRR center. 
While disengaged combatants at the DRR center in
Baidoa generally consented to participate,  but some
refused. A few did not want to take part in our re-
search at all, while some did participate but did not
want to answer all of our questions. The reasons for
refusal—which may have  impacted  the  findings—in-
clude simply not wanting to answer questions, prefer-
ring to spend their time in other ways, having already
questioning at the time of defection and upon intake
into the DRR center, psychological trauma reliving ex-
periences in Al-Shabaab, and possibly ongoing sympa-
thies for  Al-Shabaab.  The findings that  may be im-
pacted by this include: motive for joining, reason for
defection, and current views of Al-Shabaab. Two inter-
viewees answered some of the questions in a manner
that  led  us  to  suspect  ongoing  sympathies  for  Al-
Shabaab, suggesting that those with ongoing sympa-
thies did not completely avoid participation. 
Language was also a limitation. Baidoa is the center
of a Somali dialect not spoken in most of the country,
called Maay Maay. All of the individuals interviewed
spoke Maay Maay. We hired a translator who lived in
Baidoa and was fluent in Maay Maay, Standard So-
mali, and English. Our researchers do not speak Stan-
dard Somali or Maay Maay and were thus dependent
on translation for the interviews. 
Lastly, the study was limited with regard to gender
and age.  The population  we had access  to were  all
males over the age of eighteen. Disengaged combat-
ants under the age of eighteen are sent to a different
rehabilitation center and there is currently no center
in Somalia for disengaged female Al-Shabaab combat-
ants.
3 Methodology
Because access to disengaged combatants in Somalia
is  extremely  limited  by  security  concerns,  we  used
purposive  sampling  where  the  researcher  chooses  a
specific population based on a unique reason. In this
case the unique reason was the need for a population
of disengaged combatants located in a secure environ-
ment. We believe that the population of disengaged
combatants selected is typical of the average experi-
ence  of  low-level  disengaged  combatants  from  Al-
Shabaab. 
We found that a constructivist approach would yield
the best results. Given the security risks of conducting
field research, data collection via interviews yields a
large volume of data within a short period of time. We
were interested in how the interviewees understood
their experience rather than an ethnographic method
analyzing how subjects interact and create meaning.
The interviews therefore created space for subjects to
share their experience and thoughts, and to direct the
conversation. Interviewees were asked a list of prede-
termined quantitative and qualitative questions with
the option for the interviewer to ask follow-up ques-
tions.  Some  interviewees  refused  to  answer  certain
questions,  while  in cases where the interviewee im-
posed time  constraints  certain  questions  had to  be
omitted. 
Formal (written) approval from the Bay Ministry for
Disarmament,  Rehabilitation,  and Reintegration was
granted for access to the Baidoa center to conduct the
study. Interviews were conducted at the center over
the  course  of  five  days.  Center  staff  (Somalis)  re-
cruited participants throughout the week at settings
including meals, classroom time, and free time. It was
made clear that the study was voluntary. Interviews
were  conducted  in  a  private  interview room;  parti-
cipants were given a consent form in Standard Somali,
which was read to them in Maay Maay. Disengaged
combatants  are  vulnerable  to  retaliation  by  Al-
Shabaab, which assumes they are collaborating with
the FGS. In order to avoid physical documents linking
the defectors  to our study,  we used audio recorded
verbal rather than written consent. Interviewees were
then asked to consent to audio recording of the inter-
view. Where the participant declined, recording was
stopped after the consent process and the interview
proceeded without it. The audio recordings are stored
on two encrypted external hard drives kept by the re-
searchers.  The data is  password protected and only
the researchers have access. Only the researchers had
access to individually identifiable information on age
and clan,  which was destroyed once the  study was
complete. Refreshments worth approximately $3 were
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provided during each interview, which lasted between
thirty minutes and one hour.
It  is  also important  to note  that  the  interviewees
may have provided false or misleading information for
reasons  including:  flawed memories,  fear  of  threats
for divulging vital information, exaggerating or dimin-
ishing their role in violence, exaggeration of coercion
in their recruitment. Nevertheless we believe the in-
terviewees provided largely accurate and truthful in-
formation.  The  identity  protection  we  ensured
through  our  consent  process,  helped  minimize  the
threat to interviewees, who were very forthcoming in
sharing  information  that  would  endanger  them
should it become known by Al-Shabaab. We were not
interested in the disengaged combatants’ role in vio-
lence,  so  that  line  of  questioning  was  not  pursued;
this put interviewees at ease. Another aspect suggest-
ing that interviewees were honest is that 84 percent
admitted joining Al-Shabaab voluntarily. An intervie-
wee who was attempting to retroactively appear as a
victim would emphasize coercion in their recruitment
process. 
4 Summary of Data
The data set comprises thirty-two interviews with dis-
engaged  Al-Shabaab  combatants  conducted  at  the
Baidoa DRR Center in July 2017 by the director of re-
search, Christian Taylor.
4.1 Recruitment
The clan breakdown was 17 percent Jirron (Mirifle-Ra-
hanweyn),  14  percent  Elay  (Mirifle-Rahanweyn),  10
percent Hadame (Rahanweyn), 10 percent Huber (Ra-
hanweyn), 7 percent Geledle (Rahanweyn), 7 percent
Eyle  (Rahanweyn),  7  percent  Leisan (Mirifle-Rahan-
weyn),  3  percent  Harin  (Mirifle-Rahanweyn),  3  per-
cent Ma’allin Wayne (Mirifle-Rahanweyn), 3 percent
Haraw (Mirifle-Rahanweyn), 3 percent Garwle (Miri-
fle-Rahanweyn), 3 percent Garre (Digil-Rahanweyn), 3
percent Geledle (Rahanweyn),  3 percent Yantar (Ra-
hanweyn), 3 percent Hadame (Rahanweyn), 3 percent
Yantar (Rahanweyn) (clan classification UNHCR So-
malia 2004). All of the interviewees were part of the
overarching  Rahanweyn  clan,  which  is  one  of  four
major clans in Somalia (Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and Ra-
hanweyn). While the Darood, Hawiye, and Dir are pri-
marily  nomadic-pastoralists  and  are  considered  the
noble clans, the Rahanweyn are agro-pastoralists liv-
ing in southern Somalia near the Juba and Shabelle
rivers where the most fertile land in Somalia is found
(Gundel 2009, 11). Al-Shabaab’s core territorial strong-
hold is in this area of Jubaland. Baidoa, where the in-
terviews took place, is the capital of Bay region, the
historic home of the Rahanweyn clan and current Al-
Shabaab stronghold. We believe Rahanweyn members
of Al-Shabaab defected to their own clan region be-
cause of geographic proximity or in hopes of better
treatment from their  clan in  the  DRR process.  This
would explain the high numbers of Rahanweyn defec-
tors in the Baidoa center. Although we do not have
clan data for disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants  at
other DRR centers in Somalia, we suspect there would
be a broader mix of clan identities there.
The noble clans speak Af-Maxaa-tiri, which has be-
come the official language of Somalia and is known as
Standard Somali. The Rahanweyn speak Af-Maay-tiri,
better known as Maay Maay (Gundel 2009, 11). All of
the interviews were conducted in Maay Maay as this
is  the primary language of  the  disengaged combat-
ants interviewed. 
The average age when joining Al-Shabaab was eigh-
teen  years,  with  a  range  from  fourteen  to  twenty-
nine.  The average age at interview was twenty-four
(range eighteen to thirty-five). The average duration
of  the  recruitment  process  was  three  and  a  half
months. 66 percent of interviewees were recruited or
forced to join Al-Shabaab by someone they knew. Of
those,  50  percent  of  the  interviewees  joined  Al-
Shabaab  by  themselves  and 50  percent  joined with
others. 84 percent of interviewees joined voluntarily,
while 12 percent were forced to join Al-Shabaab. Dur-
ing the recruitment process 63 percent of the intervie-
wees  said  they  were  not  promised  anything  by  Al-
Shabaab.  33 percent were promised a salary if  they
joined. 46 percent said that they joined for religious
reasons while 21 percent said they joined for financial
reasons and 19 percent joined out of a desire for vio-
lence. Lastly, 59 percent said they had hope for their
future and 65 percent said they felt safe before join-
ing. 
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4.2 Membership
The average duration of  membership of  Al-Shabaab
was 4.83 years (range one month to ten years). Thir-
teen  interviewees  declined  to  state  their  reason for
staying in the organization; of those who did respond,
the most common was religion. One said he stayed in
Al-Shabaab because he believed he would go to par-
adise if he was killed. Other reasons disengaged com-
batants mentioned included various economic motiva-
tions, nationalist reasons, and becoming accustomed
to the Al-Shabaab lifestyle. Regardless of the reason
for staying in the organization, 91 percent said they
felt  a sense of  brotherhood. Most did not have any
fears  while  a  member.  Those  who did primarily  re-
ported  being  afraid  of  different  types  of  violence,
specifically drone strikes. One particularly interesting
response was the interviewee was most afraid of mak-
ing problems for his fellow Somalis. 
Reported  functions  in  Al-Shabaab  broke  down  as
follows:  53 percent combatants, 14 percent officers/
Al-Shabaab police, 11 percent drivers, 11 percent tax
collectors, 3 percent assassin, 3 percent cameraman, 3
percent livestock herder, and 3 percent still in train-
ing. Salaries varied greatly, often dependent on role.
The average was $58/month, the range $0 to $250. The
members paid the most were assassins and organiza-
tional  leaders,  while  those  making  the  least  were
those still in training and drivers. Assassins are paid
250 USD per successful target.
4.3 Defection
There were many similarities in the manner and moti-
vation of the defections, with a few fascinating out-
liers. The average amount of time spent considering
defection was 6.3 months with the longest being 48
months and the shortest an impromptu decision with
no time allotted for consideration.  52 percent snuck
away from Al-Shabaab while 34 percent failed to re-
turn from leave (members receive one month leave for
every  seven months  of  service).  70  percent  had  re-
ceived death threats from Al-Shabaab after defecting,
while 30 percent have not. 22 percent said they dis-
carded their SIM card or mobile phone to prevent Al-
Shabaab delivering threats and we suspect others did
the same resulting. 
39 percent defected because of differences over Is-
lamic  ideology that  developed after  the  interviewee
joined the  Al-Shabaab and experienced its  ideology
firsthand. One recurring theme was that Al-Shabaab
commanders were on a “wrong religious path”. 29 per-
cent defected because of indiscriminate killings. Inter-
viewees reported being ordered by Al-Shabaab com-
manders to kill Muslims and civilians for no reason.
16  percent  defected  for  familial  reasons  –  to  keep
them their family safe, to provide for them, or on their
advice. 13 percent defected for financial reasons, feel-
ing they were not paid enough. 6 percent defected be-
cause  of  infighting.  One  interviewee  had  been  re-
cruited  by  Ibrahim  Haji  Jama  (alias  Ibrahim  al
Afghani), a member of the Shura Council and found-
ing member of Al-Shabaab. Afghani was his comman-
der during his seven years as a member. Afghani was
killed  on  June  20,  2013,  by  forces  loyal  to  the  Al-
Shabaab  emir,  Ahmed  Abdi  Godane  (Horadam  and
Sorhaindo 2011,  updated 2013).  The interviewee de-
fected because of this internal fratricide. 6 percent de-
fected  because  they  wanted  a  lifestyle  change  and
were tired of soldiering. The following reasons were
each cited by one interviewee: wasting time, leave cut
short, Al-Shabaab diminished, harsh living conditions,
injuries from conflict, amnesty offer by Somali Presi-
dent, never wanted to be there to begin with, fear of
FGS coalition, spontaneous,  and being forced to kill
relatives. 
All thirty-two interviewees saw themselves as good
Muslims.  When asked if  their  Islamic ideology had
changed since defecting from Al-Shabaab, 78 percent
answered yes and 22 percent answered no. The latter
breaks down as 10 percent left for practical reasons
(financial and amnesty offer), 6 percent left for no rea-
son (“just decided to”), and 6 percent left because of
indiscriminate killing. When asked directly if they still
agreed  with  Al-Shabaab  ideology,  92  percent  an-
swered no, 4 percent answered “to some extent”, and 4
percent refused to answer (the same interviewee who
“just decided to” defect for no reason). 79 percent did
not think Islam was under threat while 21 percent did
(two-thirds of whom thought Islam was under threat
from Al-Shabaab). 
24 percent  had no regrets  about leaving,  while  21
percent regretted their lack of freedom of movement
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due to the threat from Al-Shabaab, 12 percent regret-
ted having lost time and opportunities, 12 percent re-
gretted the stigmatization now attached to them by
Somali  society,  12  percent  regretted  joining  Al-
Shabaab in the first place, 6 percent regretted the in-
juries they incurred, 6 percent regretted killing inno-
cents, one (3 percent) regretted defecting and wished
he was still in Al-Shabaab, one regretted fighting for
nothing, and 3 percent regretted his inability to take
revenge on Al-Shabaab.
4.4 Wrap-Up
Half  of  the  interviewees  had  recommendations  on
how best to combat Al-Shabaab. The most common
response involved violence against Al-Shabaab or ca-
pacity  building  and  better  training  for  the  govern-
ment. Other respondents recommended increased use
of technology, dialogue, and rehabilitation. 
5 Findings
In this study, we found defection to be an unsafe op-
tion for Al-Shabaab combatants. The lack of security
for disengaged combatants has made them fearful for
their  lives  and is  possibly  discouraging more  defec-
tors. 
The  disengaged  combatants  interviewed  in  our
study live in the DRR center in the government-con-
trolled town of Baidoa. Al-Shabaab controls the terri-
tory directly outside the town and a covert presence
within it. The DRR center is located on a secure street
along with the AMISOM base, and has AMISOM per-
sonnel guarding the fortified compound. If the disen-
gaged combatants remain in the center, they are safe.
But if they leave the compound their personal secu-
rity is at risk. 
The DRR program run at the center is admirable (al-
though we did not conduct a review or evaluation).
The primary,  consensus  concern of  the interviewees
was that despite security at the center, the rehabilita-
tion program, and the grant available upon comple-
tion  of  the  program,  they  lacked  personal  security
outside of the center. . 70 percent of the disengaged
combatants  have  received  death  threats  from  Al-
Shabaab, and many described themselves as “hunted”.
At the end of each interview, we gave the interviewee
an opportunity to share anything else they wanted to.
Four returned the question to the interviewer: “What
should I do now?” Interviewees said that as soon as
they left the center they would be killed: they knew of
Al-Shabaab spies in Baidoa waiting for them to leave
the protection of the center to kill them. 
As described in the literature review, intrastate de-
fection poses challenges that interstate defection does
not. Interstate defection is a relocation program. An
individual is defecting from one state to another and
receives asylum and protection in the recipient state.
In exchange for cooperation and intelligence, the re-
cipient country provides for and protects the defector.
This asylum geographically removes the defector from
the  threat  of  the  state  they  defected  from.  In  in-
trastate defection there is no foreign asylum. A Somali
Al-Shabaab defector remains in Somalia after defec-
tion. Additionally, there is no immigration option for a
disengaged  Al-Shabaab  combatant.  No  state  will
knowingly allow a former member of Al-Shabaab to
immigrate to their state. Also, it is typical for econom-
ically developed states to employ witness protection,
while the FGS and Somali state governments are ill-
equipped to provide basic services, let alone put dis-
engaged combatants in witness protection. And lastly,
even if  the Somali  government could afford witness
protection, changing identity is extremely challenging
in the interconnected clan-based society of Somalia.
The clan structure is also informative in understand-
ing the  mobilization and defection  challenges  faced
by  Rahanweyn  disengaged  combatants.  In  Somalia,
and specifically in South Central Somalia, the tradi-
tional clan judicial system called xeer came to play a
significant role in the course of the two-decade civil
war.  In  xeer,  clan  elders  make  judgments  on  cases
within their own clan and between members of differ-
ent clans. The Rahanweyn are a minority clan to the
noble clans of Darood, Hawiye, and Dir. As a result,
they do not enjoy the cross-clan xeer agreements that
the  noble  clans  have  and  thus  are  politically  and
structurally  marginalized  (Gundel  2009,  23).  Conse-
quently, youth from the Rahanweyn clan supply most
of  the  low-level  combatants  of  Al-Shabaab.  The
Baidoa DRR Center estimates that 90 percent of the
low-level  Al-Shabaab  members  are  from  the  Bay,
Bakool,  and  Lower  Juba  regions  and  are  predomi-
nantly  Maay  Maay  speakers  from  the  Rahanweyn
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clan. Al-Shabaab exploits the clan-based conflict to re-
cruit  young,  marginalized,  impressionable  men  to
their  cause.  Yet,  as  the  low-level  Rahanweyn  Al-
Shabaab combatants come to understand the extrem-
ist ideology of Al-Shabaab, they reject it. 71 percent
defected  due  to  religious  reasons  or  disagreement
over  killing  practices,  exhibiting  a  disagreement  of
principle with Al-Shabaab ideology.  We believe that
most  of  our  interviewees  did not  adhere  to the ex-
tremist views of Al-Shabaab when they joined the or-
ganization. 70 percent of the 47 percent who joined
for religious reasons had a poor understanding of Al-
Shabaab’s religious views.
Disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants  took an enor-
mous risk in defecting. Their lives are now threatened
and they are hunted by the very group the FGS and
the international community encouraged them to de-
fect from. It is the duty of the FGS and the interna-
tional community to create conditions to address the
personal security of disengaged combatants. And it is
imperative to do so to encourage more defectors.
6 Recommendations
On the basis of our findings, we would like to make a
few  recommendations  regarding  personal  security
and increasing rates of defection. These are divergent
to the status quo – and as such not without draw-
backs  or  challenges  –  because  we  believe  this  im-
mense challenge requires an atypical solution. 
The first recommendation addresses the lack of per-
sonal  security  for  disengaged  combatants.  One  ap-
proach to address is to create a safe haven inside So-
malia. A secure territory would need to be negotiated
with the FGS, the host federal state, and the regional
government(s). Economic support and security incen-
tives would need to be provided to the host state and
region by the FGS and international donors. Security
could be provided by AMISOM and/or SNA. A single,
secure region would be the optimal solution. With 90
percent  of  low-level  Al-Shabaab  combatants  hailing
from  the  Bay,  Bakool,  and  Lower  Juba  regions,  it
would be ideal for the safe haven(s) to be located in
those areas. In addition to providing safety for disen-
gaged combatants, a safe haven would also protect lo-
cal civilians. Reintegration programs would need to be
emphasized to address the concerns of the local resi-
dents.  Disengaged  combatants  need  security  and
safety from Al-Shabaab attacks to restart their social
and economical lives. One potential drawback to this
approach is  separation from family  and clan.  Close
proximity to family in can help immensely with the
rehabilitation  and  reintegration  process  (although
some families want nothing to do with their former
Al-Shabaab family member). Nevertheless, disengaged
combatants need a secure location first and foremost.
It  is  imperative  to  protect  them and  their  families
from Al-Shabaab reprisals.  To help with the familial
disconnect,  stipends  could  be  given  to  disengaged
combatants  to  visit  their  families  covertly.  Locating
the safe haven in Bay, Bakool, or Lower Juba would
address some of the proximity issues.
Another way to address personal security is to inte-
grate  disengaged  combatants  into  the  SNA,  giving
them  the  institutional  protection  of  the  army.  Al-
though taking part in SNA combat operations against
Al-Shabaab is dangerous, it is less dangerous than be-
ing hunted by Al-Shabaab without the protection of
the  SNA.  As  SNA  is  tasked  with  combatting  Al-
Shabaab,  disengaged  combatants  from  Al-Shabaab
could provide useful operational information. Lastly,
serving  in  the  SNA  would  provide  a  consistent  in-
come,  helping them reestablish their  lives  economi-
cally. Some disengaged Al-Shabaab combatants have
been integrated into the security forces in other areas
of Somalia, but we have yet to see studies on the im-
pact. Also, it is important to note that SNA comman-
ders and political leaders may be opposed to this ap-
proach as they distrust disengaged Al-Shabaab com-
batants.  Additionally,  significant  issues  in  the  SNA
need to be addressed in order to make this a viable
option.  First,  the  troops  are  poorly  armed,  trained,
and  paid,  generating  reluctance  (Camacho  and
Abukar 2017). The SNA requires a significant commit-
ment  of  resources  to  build  and retain  an  adequate
force with the ability to provide security and combat
insurgencies such as Al-Shabaab. Secondly, the SNA is
made up of clan-based militias whose first allegiance
is to their clan and regional identity. In order to make
the SNA a cohesive fighting force, a national Somali
identity needs to surmount the clan identity (Cama-
cho and Abukar  2017,  7).  Despite  the problems  the
SNA  continues  to  struggle  with,  integrating  disen-
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gaged  Al-Shabaab  combatants  into  the  SNA  could
benefit both sides. Another benefit would be the op-
tion of disengaged combatants integrating into SNA
forces  operating  in  their  home  region  and  sharing
their clan identity. This would place them geographi-
cally in their home region with fellow clan and family
members,  making  rehabilitation  and  reintegration
more  effective.  With  many  clan  militias  now  inte-
grated into the SNA, this affords clans the best oppor-
tunity to provide security  guarantees  to disengaged
combatants.  Nonetheless,  the  IOM  Director  of  the
DRR Center in Baidoa made it clear that IOM is not
in support of this option. They believe that returning
these young men to combat situations would be psy-
chologically  detrimental  to  their  rehabilitation  and
reintegration process. 
Our second recommendation concerns encouraging
more defections. A significant number of interviewees
said  they  joined  Al-Shabaab  for  religious  reasons.
They  believed  Al-Shabaab  represented  the  “right
path” for devout followers of Allah.  These same de-
vout  young  Muslims  defected  from Al-Shabaab  be-
cause they came to see Al-Shabaab as un-Islamic and
therefore felt a moral imperative to defect. They re-
tained their Islamic faith after defection. One key to
discouraging recruitment and promoting defection is
to communicate and demonstrate the un-Islamic na-
ture of Al-Shabaab and present pious devotees with
greater  Islamic  opportunities  in  Somali  society.  We
would challenge the notion that “Islam-bashing” en-
courages defection. Instead of depicting Islam as an
inherently  violent  religion,  narratives  exposing  Al-
Shabaab as un-Islamic and demonstrating true Islam
will  promote  defection.  One major  challenge is  the
question who gets to determine what is and is not Is-
lamic?  Is  it  the  community  of  international  donors,
the FGS, Somali Imams, or others? Whatever the an-
swer,  Al-Shabaab  recruits,  members,  and  defectors
embody an Islamic piety and there is an opportunity
and a need to engage in the arena of ideas that is
driving young men to join such insurgencies. The pro-
gram would do well to focus on the young men of the
Rahanweyn clan, as this is the group Al-Shabaab is re-
cruiting low-level combatants and thus where a pro-
gram  promoting  an  alternative  Islamic  ideology  is
needed to reduce recruitment.
7 Implications 
One recurring theme was the lack of personal security
for disengaged combatants after defection. 70 percent
of  interviewees  had been threatened by Al-Shabaab
since they defected, and some had seen their family
threatened as well. Several who had not been threat-
ened had changed their telephone number or thrown
away their old mobile phone. We believe they would
have been threatened otherwise. Although the disen-
gaged combatants are secure within the DRR center,
there is no plan for long term security once they leave.
It  is  likely  they  will  be  hunted  and  killed  by  Al-
Shabaab. 
Although the DRR center provides economic and ed-
ucational incentives for finishing the program, includ-
ing technical training and a small loan to start a busi-
ness,  several  participants  mentioned  concerns  that
they would be unable to take advantage of this type
of assistance because of  the lack of  personal  safety
outside the center. The implications of this will affect
nearly every area of their future. It will be difficult for
the disengaged combatants to reunite with their fami-
lies without risking their own and their family’s lives.
Starting a business will also be difficult because it will
be  hard to stay in  one area or  establish a physical
presence. Additionally, the tribal structure of Somali
society makes it difficult to hide or relocate without
people realizing who you are based on clan relations. 
Another implication of the lack of personal security
is that defection may become less common. 91 per-
cent of interviewees mentioned a feeling of brother-
hood with their  fellow combatants  when they were
members of Al-Shabaab, and many were still in con-
tact with friends who were still members. One inter-
viewee mentioned that  he was discouraging his  Al-
Shabaab  friends  from  defecting  because  the  center
had  not  lived  up  to  his  expectations.  If  defection
proves to be fatal, defections will dwindle. Those who
are interested in undermining Al-Shabaab through de-
fection will need to consider the lack of security for
disengaged combatants as a significant factor. 
8 Future Research
Two  topics  discussed  briefly  in  this  paper  require
deeper exploration and research: the impact of drone
strikes on Al-Shabaab and an Islamic counternarrative
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to Al-Shabaab. Six disengaged combatants specifically
mentioned  their  fear  of  drone  strikes  while  in  Al-
Shabaab. The US government employed drone strikes
as an increasingly prominent tool in the “war on ter-
ror”  (Klaidman 2012).  Since 2002,  the United States
has  launched  4,788  drone  strikes  against  Al-Qaeda
and their affiliates, including Al-Shabaab (The Bureau
of Investigative Journalism 2018). The US counterin-
surgency strategy began to utilize drone strikes after
the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks with the objec-
tive of taking the fight to the enemy. With an increase
of  reliance  of  drone  strikes  as  a  counterinsurgency
mechanism, an in-depth study on the impacts and un-
intended  consequences  is  warranted.  Are  drone
strikes degrading or helping grow insurgencies? Are
civilian  deaths  due  to  drone  strikes  creating  fertile
ground for recruiting and local insurgency support?
Drone warfare is viewed as keeping the US safe. But
does  it?  This  assumption  needs  to  be  studied  and
scrutinized, also to determine if drone strikes are an
effective  means  to  degrade  an  insurgency  like  Al-
Shabaab.
The other topic that deserves further study is  the
recommendation we made for an Islamic counternar-
rative to Al-Shabaab ideology. Based on our data, we
see  a  common  thread  of  religious  piety  running
through decisions to join Al-Shabaab, decisions to de-
fect, and on into post-defection life. The is a clear op-
portunity to diminish Al-Shabaab through a culturally
strategic initiative requires a comprehensively fleshed
out intervention. 
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